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Don't be fooled by what is absent from the prosaic title. With The Catholic 
Church and fhe Holocaust, 1930-1965, Michael Phayer has written the best 
Pius XI1 book to appear in the recently resurgent controversy. By virtue of its 
attention-grabbing title, John Cornwell's Hitler's Pope (1  999) is the best known 
of the lot.' But Phayer, rejecting Cornwell's thesis that anti-Semitism is the best 
explanation for Pius XII's behavior during the Holocaust, undertakes a less sen- 
sational and more professional asses~ment .~ 
One must understand Cornwell's conclusion as part of a personal, journal- 
istic quest to make sense of the Church's wartime record. Cornwell started to 
write his book in order to refute a group of young Catholics critical of Pius XI], 
who, one evening, had argued with him that, "the Church had sided with all the 
worst right-wing elements in the history of the 20th cen t~ry . "~  To his "moral 
shock,'' however, Cornwell discovered that, with regard to anti-Semitism, Pius 
XI1 was, on balance, part of the problem rather than part of any cure, either 
spiritual or political. Thus bewildered, Cornwell then drew hasty conclusions 
about Pius XIl's personal motives. 
Rather than inviting the reader to pass judgment on the anti-Semitism of 
one important man, and thus run the risk of scapegoating, Phayer provides the 
reader with evidence leading to more productive conclusions. They are more 
productive in that they address the collective responsibility of an institution, 
which still lives, and not the guilt of one man, who is now dead. Consequently, 
Phayer's book is the best one-volume introduction to the Holocaust memory 
that the Church, as an institution, must cultivate, at least if it is to face the future 
honestly. 
Instead of focusing his narrative on the personality of the wartime Pope, 
Phayer tackles the question of Catholic anti-Semitism in a measured historical 
context: before, during, and after the Holocaust. Only four out of eleven chap- 
ters analyze events during the Holocaust: three analyze before, and four after. 
With the sweep of this non-biographical scope, Phayer is able to assess Pius XI1 
more soundly than Cornwell. Paradoxically, by not making Pius XI1 the pri- 
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mary focus, Phayer is able to shed even more light on Pius XII's career than if 
he had. By chronicling Catholic resistance to anti-Semitism from 1930 to 1965, 
Phayer is able to make an effective contrast between Pius XI1 and the vanguard 
of that resistance. 
More often than not, Pius XI1 was an obstacle to the resistance. In the 
words of Cardinal Tisserant, the Vatican chose instead to follow "a policy of 
selfish c~nvenience."~ Tisserant wrote these words in 1940, but, as Phayer 
shows, they also characterized subsequent Vatican policy. The misplaced prior- 
ities of the Vatican are painfully clear in retrospect, but Pius XI1 even ignored 
the protests of those who saw his misplaced priorities in advance. "Our superi- 
ors do not want to understand the real nature of this conflict," wrote Tisserant 
to Cardinal S ~ h a r d . ~  
France's postwar ambassador to the Vatican, philosopher Jacques Maritain, 
had warned presciently about anti-Semitism before the war.6 Yet Pius XI1 still 
ignored Maritain's post-Holocaust warnings about postwar anti-Semitism (177- 
82). Pius XI1 chose rather to combat Communism, not postwar anti-Semitism. 
Accordingly, he made anti-Communism the bedrock of Church spirituality and 
discipline. The Vatican viewed with suspicion philo-Semitic and pro-Israel 
Christians like Gertrud Luckner and it investigated those with her who were 
engaged in advancing post-Holocaust dialogue with Jews (176-77). 
In order that they might live to fight Communism another day, the Vatican 
sought clemency for convicted war criminals and assisted them in postwar 
escape (162-75). In spite of all this, Pius XII's apologists today still have the 
nerve to dismiss any observation of his papacy's historical favour for Nazis over 
Communists as "standard Communist propaganda" (76-77). 
Pius XI1 may not have been anti-Semitic, but he certainly had greater pri- 
orities than resistance to anti-Semitism. The welfare of the Catholic Church 
was his greatest priority, and hetping Jews in need figured in his plans only 
when he judged it would not place his greater aims in jeopardy. For example, 
he saw Rome as the symbol of universal Catholicism, and hence the fate of 
Rome's Jews was subordinate to his fears over whether the Vatican would be 
bombed during wartime (6 1-64; 97- 104). 
Jews were, in effect, pawns to be sacrificed on Pius XII's diplomatic chess- 
board, however regrettable and sorrowful this was to him. Although the papacy 
was restricted in terms of worldly power, Pius XI1 saw himself as a chessboard 
king, albeit similarly constrained. His vanity was most pronounced in the way 
he cultivated his stance as a Vicar of Christ, the role of a divine peacemaker 
unsoiled by worldly affairs. In order that he might be the postwar broker of 
peacc, and thereby accrue honour and prestige for him and the Church, he pur- 
sued a diplomatic policy of neutrality that kept him from explicitly condemn- 
ing particular acts of genocide (54-61). In reality he was far from neutral. At all 
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times he preferred a strong Germany, to fight Communism, and accordingly he 
obsessively micromanaged Vatican relations with Germany, in order to pre- 
serve his desired queen on the chessboard. To keep this queen, he sacrificed the 
pawns, and Phayer documents how Pius XI1 consistently subordinated the exer- 
cise of moral leadership to diplomatic considerations. 
The bishops on Pius XII's chessboard in their own way, also failed in their 
leadership. Phayer devotes an entire chapter to survey the higher clergy geo- 
graphically across Europe. Absent Pius XII's lead, Phayer shows how they were 
reluctant to sacrifice themselves by resistance. Many would actually fear mak- 
ing the Pope look bad by doing so. Some acted admirably, but most did not. 
Only one European bishop lost his life on account of hiding Jews (109). 
The bishops, moreover, were not encouraged in resistance by the Vatican, 
which kept atrocities under a veil of silence. Information about acts of geno- 
cide, which could mobilize sentiment and inspire resistance, when it was given 
by any one bishop or informant to the Vatican, was not shared by the Vatican 
with other bishops. The Vatican, despite having the centralized resources to 
gather and disseminate information, failed to leverage what institutional advan- 
tages its global bureaucracy had.' 
Even before the Holocaust, as Phayer documents in two chapters, the 
Vatican abdicated its moral authority by failing to condemn genocide in Poland 
in 1939 and Croatia in 1941. It opted instead to pursue diplomatic strategies 
aiming to shore up the political power of Catholicism in Europe. During the 
Holocaust, some lower clergy and laypeople spoke out against Nazism and suf- 
fered for it. As Phayer shows, they were not adequately encouraged in their res- 
cue efforts by the hierarchy, and so widespread resistance failed to occur. 
Worse, disdain for Jews was not adequately admonished by the hierarchy, and, 
in the current political climate, this was tantamount to blowing in the same 
direction as the Nazi wind. 
The future of Catholicism, however, lay with the rescuers and dissidents, 
who, in co-operation with Jews, paved the way for the eventual renunciation of 
Church anti-Semitism at Vatican 11. Phayer's book has the virtue of being able 
to draw upon his own previous research into many women rescuers and to pay 
homage to them: Gertrud Luckner, who, while en route to Rabbi Leo Baeck 
with relief money, was arrested and sent to Ravensbriick, but survived and went 
on to advance Christian-Jewish relations; French underground member 
Germaine Bocquet, who hid Jules Isaac while he wrote Jesus and Isruel; con- 
vent rescuers Matylda Getter and Margit Slachta; diocesan rescuer Margareta 
Sommer; Zofia Kossak-Sczcucka of rescue organization Zegota; and Germaine 
Ribiere of Amitie Chrktienne. 
Apologists for Pius XI1 consistently arrogate to him the rescue efforts of 
such Catholics, and they try to claim that Pius XI1 provided the leadership for 
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such efforts. Phayer does not engage these polemicists but, much more effec- 
tively, notes instead, event by event, the lack of documentation of such leader- 
ship. He also notes, by documenting the Vatican's other institutional priorities, 
the obstacles erected by the Vatican for resistance to anti-Semitism. 
The most effective rejoinder to the right-wing polemicists, however, ought 
to be based upon the evidence that Phayer assembles regarding the Vatican's 
postwar record. It is a sorry record that sheds light on the hidden motives of the 
preceding years. The Pius XI1 apologists understandably pass over it in silence. 
If the apologists want the moral capital of any Catholic resistance to anti- 
Semitism to accrue to the papacy, simply because Pius XI1 did on occasion 
effect the rescue of some Jews, it is only fair to apply such logic consistently. 
The infamy of Catholics' sins of omission and commission with regard to anti- 
Semitism ought also to accrue to Pius XII, since he too subordinated a moral 
response to anti-Semitism to preoccupation with other concerns. The magni- 
tude of this mutual failure renders irrelevant the question of who was imitating 
whom. 
As Phayer documents, Catholic inaction outweighed Catholic action from 
1930- 1965. Nevertheless, as Vatican I1 heralded the future would still belong 
to the activists. 
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